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Abstract
This paper attempts to quantify how the rapid increase in shale gas production in
the past fifteen years has impacted regional natural gas spot prices. This method
of natural gas extraction-pumping water mixed with sand and clay first vertically
and then horizontally, with clay and sand particulates holding fractures open to
allow the flow of natural gas-has a shorter well lifespan and faster decline rate
than conventional wells. Through analyzing the degree of market integration
between shale gas production and spot prices, we can quantify what impact
different shale plays have had on the regional pricing of natural gas. With this
information, we can then discuss how the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale, a
relatively untapped shale play in the Northeast, could impact different natural gas
price regions.
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Chapter I. Introduction
1.1 Natural Gas and America’s Energy Future
As the human population grows exponentially, energy demand grows along with it in an
even greater exponential fashion. The great industrial revolutions and technological advances
have snowballed into a growing addiction to a consistent and abundant supply of energy to
power our innovations. Through a combination of the convenience of fossil fuel power and a
daunting understanding of the global threats that these resources hold, management of the
American energy supply has been an emotional debate in recent years and two distinct
perspectives have arisen.
One perspective is offered in Al Gore’s documentary The Inconceivable Truth, which
brought global warming to the national spotlight. Leaders of the ‘smart grid,’ an innovative
electrical grid that would allow for greater diversity in energy sources and would change the way
in which power is transmitted, also pride themselves within this perspective. They argue that as
the earth continues to rise in temperature, to levels as high as our society has ever known, we
must find ways to use energy efficiently, altering our fuel structure to harness power from
renewable sources that can produce clean and consistent fuel, which will guarantee America a
secure resource base and a healthy planet.
Another perspective is voiced by leaders of petroleum companies and the many large
businesses that thrive on the accessibility of the current electrical grid. This group argues that our
current grid, supporting cheap and abundant fuel, has rarely failed our energy needs and large
capital investments into new energy infrastructure will sacrifice technological progress. These
two perspectives must come together and understand an adequate solution to both ensure our
stable energy structure while promoting continued economic growth. The two groups will likely
find a middle ground through the use of a flexible supply of both renewable and non-renewable
fuel generation.
Natural Gas is one of the many fossil fuels we use today, and it has been rising since
1996 as a fuel source for electricity generation (Figure 1-1). This rise has driven coal use down
to its lowest share of electricity generation since 1995. Coal and natural gas essentially compete
for the same consumer base: utilities that generate electricity, industry that can use either fuel for
heat, and homeowners and commercial businesses that buy electricity packages from local
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suppliers based on prices. As natural gas use has gone up at the expense of coal, the price of
natural gas has recently gone down relative to coal. This counterintuitive drop in the price of
natural gas is due to the increasingly large supply of natural gas due to the rise in unconventional
gas production.

Electricity Net Generation: Coal vs. Natural
Gas

2.5E+09

2E+09

Coal

1.5E+09
Thousand kWh
1E+09

Natural Gas

500000000

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

0

Year

Source: EIA

Figure 1-1. Electricity Generation; Coal vs. Natural Gas (Energy Information Administration,
2013)
1.2 Unconventional Gas
The rise in supply of natural gas comes from so-called “unconventional gas,”
predominantly found in the form of shale gas using a relatively new technology known as
hydraulic fracturing, which utilizes horizontal well drilling to extract the natural gas embedded
within layers of shale rock. For years geologists have known of gas reserves in tight, deep shale
rock layers, but have deemed it too deep to get to and not economically viable to extract. The
recent sentiment is that the new technology can not only extract the gas, but at a capital cost that
it makes economic sense for producers to extract the reserves.
Shale gas plays have been notable in many different regions of the United States, most
notably the Barnett Shale in North-central Texas, the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, the
Haynesville Shale in East Texas and West Louisiana, the Woodford Shale in Oklahoma, the
Eagle Ford Shale in South Texas, and the Bakken Shale in East Montana and West North Dakota
(Figure 1-2).
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Figure 1-2. Notable Shale Plays in the United States (Energy Information Administration, 2013c)
With unconventional natural gas plays becoming a larger part of the picture, the
Marcellus Shale, the most recent shale gas play, lying in South-central New York and hitting
chunks of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, has come into the bright lights of the local
Northeast governments, as they debate whether or not the environmental risk of shale gas
extraction is worth the reward. Environmental advocates urge that fracking creates a flow of
wastewater that alters natural landscapes, decreases mined property values, produces a great
degree of pollution, and increases exposure to dangerous chemicals.
Despite some exploitation and production, the Marcellus shale has been largely
untouched, as a recent survey “estimated a mean undiscovered natural gas resource of 84,198
Billion Cubic Feet (BCF) of undiscovered, technically recovered natural gas,” (USGS 2011a).
This is 82,000 BCF larger than the previous assessment in 2002, claiming the area only
contained roughly 2 BCF of undiscovered natural gas (USGS 2011b). To put this number in
perspective, the United States used 24,285 BCF of natural gas in the year of 2011.
Hypothetically all the technically recoverable, undiscovered amount of natural gas in the
Marcellus Shale could fuel over three years of the demand of natural gas in 2011, assuming the
estimate to be accurate. This of course is impossible, but nonetheless points to the unutilized,
large supply of natural gas embedded within the Marcellus formation. This has undoubtedly
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sparked the interest of investors and gas exploration companies, but this curiosity has been met
with formidable opposition from environmental cohorts.
The exploitation of the Marcellus Shale has been hotly contested. The recent deregulation
of the Natural Gas industry has given open access to any producer to exploit a gas resource.
Exploration companies have used this freedom to lease out lands rich in Marcellus shale gas,
only to be thwarted by local governments claiming they cannot drill due to incomplete studies
into whether potential environmental hazards of shale gas fracturing can be mitigated.
‘Hydrofracking,’ or fracking for short, has raised concerns in regards to pollution and local
environments. These environmental dangers are legitimate, but if producers can mitigate the
damage done to the environment and human health then there will be noted positives from the
standpoint of both consumer and producer surplus.
A natural gas pipeline map shows that without a local supply the Northeast is dependent
on the Midwest and the Gulf of Mexico for natural gas (Figure 1-3). The exploitation of
reservoirs in the Appalachian Basin can give the northeast independence with a local supply to
help prices here become more stable. However, this may not be enough to qualm the strong
contingent of environmentalists and regulation in this region. Analyzing how the Marcellus and
other, greater developed shale plays have moved from wellhead production to regional spot price
will lend insight into how the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale could move through regional
gas markets. This knowledge could help give useful answers in a hotly contested debate.

Figure 1-3. Natural Gas Pipeline Infrastructure in America and Canada (Energy Information
Administration 2013d)
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1.2 Plan of the Research
The next four chapters will go as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes the previous literature on the
history of regulation and subsequent deregulation of the natural gas market, the determination of
the price of natural gas, the unconventional natural gas industry, and the environmental costs of
extracting natural gas from tight shale beds. Chapter 3 outlines the data series used, the methods
of determining causality between regional natural gas shale production and prices, and offers
hypotheses regarding the analysis. Chapter 4 presents the results of the cointegration analysis and
discusses inferences drawn from different levels of significance found within the analysis.
Lastly, chapter 5 ends the study with a conclusion and suggestions for further research.
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Chapter II. Literature Review
II. 1. A Brief History and Overview of the Natural Gas Industry
The natural gas industry has a long history of regulation within the market, mainly to
benefit the consumers. Beginning in the 1930s during the Great Depression and President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal included the establishment of the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) as a regulatory agency, with the power to control electric power and natural gas
companies to the benefit of the public interest. The Federal Power Act of 1935 gave the agency
the job of assuring an abundant energy supply with the goal of securing ‘just and reasonable’
prices for buyers of natural gas to be handed down to residential and commercial markets. Thus,
natural gas was regulated at both the pipeline, and city-gates. (MacAvoy 2000)
At the pipeline, regulations were set based on tariffs that ensured sufficient profits
covered capital and operational costs, interest and depreciation rates. A 1954 Supreme Court
case, Phillips Petroleum Company vs. Wisconsin, extended the jurisdiction of the FPC to control
prices at the wellhead (Doane and Spulber 1994, p.480). These regulations consisted of price
ceilings to ensure prices were no greater than the costs of exploration and production. The FPC
created an intricate process of creating a price contract that gave the well a specific price ceiling
based on the expected supply in that well. Many natural gas companies argued the ceilings given
to them, resulting in backlogging and suspensions for natural gas sellers. These problems
continued through the 1970s, and gas shortages sprang up everywhere. Breyer and MacAvoy
explain the phenomenon.
In sum, as a result of regulation in the 1960s, buyers for interstate consumption
obtained fewer reserves than they wished. For the most part, those buyers were
pipelines ultimately serving primarily residential customers. The short reserve
supplies were bid away from these buyers by interstate gas users…regulation led
to a virtually inevitable gas shortage. It brought about a variety of economically
wasteful results, and it ended up hurting those whom it was designed to benefit
(Breyer and MacAvoy 1973, pp. 979, 987).
These residential buyers, whom regulation was primarily aimed at helping, inevitably lost
because their sellers could not outbid other gas users for the shortage brought on by the price
controls. A graph is constructed to show how regulatory price ceilings can accrue producer and
consumer losses (Figure 2-1). It is estimated that through the FPC price controls, buyers and
producers both lost more than a combined $20 billion from 1968-1977 (MacAvoy 2000).
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Figure 2-1. Price Regulations and Consumer loss as a result of 1954 Supreme Court Case
Phillips Petroleum Company vs. Wisconsin. Pmarket = Market price of gas; Pfpc = Price with FPC
regulations; Qmarket = Market quantity of gas supplied; Qfpc = Quantity of Gas supplied under
FPC regulations. Triangle ABF represents Consumer Loss; Triangle BEF represents Deadweight
loss. Rectangle CBDE represents Producer Loss.
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 attempted to move in the opposite regulatory way,
hoping to restore supply-and-demand markets by creating price floors. The NGPA regulatory
scheme worked to create gradual deregulation with three different categories of gas. The first
category classified a tiny portion of gas as ‘High-cost gas,’ which narrowly defined the amount
of gas that was completely deregulated. The second category consisted of a lot more gas and was
subjected to a price floor of $2.42/MMBtu in 1980. Lastly, “old gas,” had various different price
floors averaging out to $1.75/MMBtu. New gas and most intrastate gas were scheduled for
deregulation between 1985 and 1988 (Pierce Jr., 1982, pp. 89-90). Overall, this half-deregulation
technique created different inefficiencies and the market was not yet fully deregulated when the
FPC was finally dismantled in the mid-1980s
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) replaced the FPC to rejuvenate the
industry and restore simple buying and selling relationships that producers and buyers had lost
for about 50 years. In 1985, the commission ordered open access for pipelines to become active
transporters for gas bought directly from producers, and were able to set their own rates to
compete in their given market. Open access finally took full effect in 1992, with FERC Order
636.
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The Commission’s primary aim in adopting [Order No.636] is to improve the
competitive structure of the natural gas industry and at the same time maintain an
adequate and reliable service. The Commission will do this by regulating
pipelines as merchants and as open access transporters…The first goal is to ensure
that all shippers have meaningful access to the pipeline transportation grid so that
willing buyers and sellers can meet in a competitive, national market to transact
the most efficient deals possible. As the House Committee Report to the
Decontrol Act stated, ‘All sellers must be able to reasonably reach the highestbidding buyer in an increasingly national market. All buyers must be free to reach
the lowest-selling producer, and obtain shipment of its gas to them on even terms
with other supplies (FERC, 1992, p.7)
The reform stands today, as the act implied a network of integrated natural gas spot markets in
which any seller or buyer can enter the market, hence the ‘open access.’ These reforms have now
given natural gas the ability to adjust freely to market conditions, allowing movement from
producers to consumers in a relatively hands-off approach. Residential customers now have
greater choice and service options. This approach has given the price of natural gas the ability to
drift to a set market price. However, this newfound market-driven industry brought price
volatility. With little regulation, natural gas prices have been more susceptible to shocks than it
was during regulation. This is shown through the national average natural gas wellhead price,
which starts to experience these sorts of mini-shocks in late 1987, about a year and a half after
open access and deregulation was ordered upon gas pipelines (Figure 2-2).
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Figure 2-2. Natural Gas Wellhead price from Jan-1976 to Nov-2012. (Energy Information
Administration, 2013a)
Meanwhile, deregulation within the gas industry decreased volatility in domestic
production, as production rises and falls consistently during the 1980s (Figure 2-3). After
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complete deregulation in the early 1990s, these peaks and valleys flatten and production is more
consistent, mainly due to open access laws promoting competition between many exploration
companies.
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Figure 2-3. Natural gas domestic production from Jan-1973 to Oct-2012 (Energy Administration,
2013b)
In 2011, natural gas consumption flows consisted of 24.37 TCF shipped for consumption,
while 22.38 TCF was produced by natural gas wells. Consumption mainly went to industrial
companies, electric power utilities, residential districts, and commercial establishments, while
exports accounted for 1.51 TCF. Withdrawals and additions to storage nearly cancelled each
other out.

Figure 2-4. Natural Gas Production Flows in Trillion Cubic Feet (TCF). (Energy Information
Administration 2011)

10

The natural gas industry now has three parties on the supply side and four parties on the
demand side. The supply side consists of producers, pipeline operators, and local distribution
companies (LDCs), and the demand side includes residential, commercial, industrial, and
electrical demand. First, natural gas wellheads are bought and leased by producers, where the gas
they pump is sent to the pipelines. The gas is then purchased at the city-gate by pipeline
operators or independent traders, where they sell it to three parties: electrical utilities, industrial
companies, and local distribution companies (LDCs). The LDCs buy the gas using long-term
contracts with the pipelines and redistribute their gas to residential and commercial markets
using a distribution charge, coming with a high markup from the city-gate price (Mohammadi
2011). While residential and commercial markets must go through LDCs, electrical and
industrial companies can buy straight from the pipeline and do not have to go through the
markup that residential and commercial customers are susceptible to. Industrial and electrical
companies can typically change fuels depending on prices, while residential and commercial
markets are typically tied to a single fuel, as switching between fuels is time-consuming and
requires collaboration with another LDC, and most locations only have one in their area. With
regulation firmly out the window, natural gas market players now act on prices set by market
demand and the supply of natural gas.

II. 2. Economic Analyses of Natural Gas Pricing: Determining the Price of Natural Gas
The demand for natural gas comes at the previously mentioned four levels-industrial,
electrical, commercial, and residential demands. Many studies analyze residential and
commercial demand together, because both segments respond to weather changes in similar
ways, with greater use in the winter months and less use in the summer months depending on
heating demands. There is also a fuel substitution effect, as there has been an observed historical
correlation between natural gas and oil prices. This would make sense, as both fuels can be used
for the same function and could match each other’s price movements.
The historical trend between oil and natural gas prices has been called either the 10-to-1
rule or the 6-to-1 rule (Brown and Yucel 2008). The 10-to-1 rule is where the Henry Hub natural
gas price per million BTU is equal to one-tenth the price per barrel of WTI (West Texas
Intermediate) Crude Oil. The 6-to-1 rule holds the same concept, just as one-sixth the price
instead of one-tenth. The historical trend is relatively accurate; however after 2000 the
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relationship falls out because the natural gas price series begins to get too volatile, most likely
due to the formation of a spot market for natural gas. Tests on whether oil and natural gas prices
decoupled during the period 1997-2009 have found “temporary shifts” but that the prices return
to a relationship after the volatility in natural gas prices is statistically accounted for. When
taking into account “crude oil, weather, seasonality, storage, and production disruptions explain
natural gas prices quite well,” (Brown and Yucel 2008) and when controlling for volatility, these
factors can help to determine the price of natural gas.
There is an obvious price elasticity effect, as many different studies have been used to ask
whether the demand for natural gas is elastic or inelastic. The long-run demand for natural gas
has been shown relatively elastic. Different studies show a large variation of -0.17 to -2.42, with
a mean long-run elasticity at -1.11 (Bohi 1981). Regional demand elasticities have also been
analyzed, with specific price elasticity effects analyzed in the Northeastern parts of USA
(Beierlein et al. 1981), which conclude to find natural gas demand inelastic in the short run and
elastic in the long run. Meanwhile, another study uses a two-stage least squares model to test for
price elasticities through regions in the United States and concludes that price elasticity for
demand of natural gas varies heavily from region to region.
Natural Gas demand by sector by region is found to be highly elastic; seven of the
30 equations showed own-price elasticities greater than -2.0. This finding
coincides with what Beierlein et. al have concluded about the size of own-price
elasticities of electricity and natural gas in Northeastern USA, i.e. demand is price
elastic in the long run and inelastic in the short run (Liu 1983)
This study is significant because it shows how the spot market has created regional differences
across the USA. Conclusions have also been made regarding how residential and commercial
sectors are more price sensitive than the industrial sector, as the industrial sectors have flexibility
to buy directly from different pipeline operators with little markup while residential consumers
typically go to one LDC and pay a large markup. When analyzing price elasticity and natural gas
demand on a state level with the use of an Autoregressive Lag Model, one study found
residential natural gas prices, electricity prices and heating degree days as significant while
disposable income, fuel oil prices, and industrial gas prices are insignificant, and estimate
relatively inelastic price (Payen and Loomis, 2011). Further research needs to be done on
different regions to analyze whether or not price elasticities vary from region to region in the
spot market. The regional market has caused regional variations within the natural gas demand,
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and the Northeast market has proven to be elastic in the long-run. Meanwhile, one study found
residential and commercial prices to respond in a more extreme fashion to an increase in the
wellhead price than industrial or electrical demand would, due to the fashion of the markups and
the development of the spot market (Mohammadi 2011).
The majority of the natural gas is produced offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, Texas,
Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Western Canada, and the Rocky Mountains. The northeast
states account for 2.4% of the share of natural gas production. Market centers provide services to
ease gas trading and transportation costs, while pipeline expansion has increased the integration
of the national network, all giving gas producers and sellers more choices. By analyzing spot
markets with an autoregressive regression model from 1993-1997, the early years under
deregulation, studies find the East and Central regions form a highly integrated market, but that
this market is quite segmented from the morel loosely integrated Western market (Cuddington
and Wang 2006). Another analysis of spot market integration concluded that deregulation has
integrated separate, even distant gas markets into one market (DeVany and Walls 1993). By
now, it seems as though the Law of One Price (LOOP) for the natural gas market is in full effect,
with little to no barrier of integration.
Studies have been performed to analyze competition and the elasticity of substitution
between coal, natural gas, and petroleum for electricity generation and industrial use. One report
took nine studies done previously on American industrial fuel substitution to analyze average
substitution elasticities. They found these elasticities to be low except for the coal-natural gas
substitution which was -0.7185 (Stern 2009). One study uses a locally flexible translog form to
investigate interfuel substitution, to which they find all elasticities relatively low, suggesting
interfuel substitution as limited in the near term (Serletis et al. 2010). Lastly, the EIA conducted
their own study of fuel substitution within power generation, and found elasticities to be
relatively low with the exception of substitution between petroleum and natural gas (Energy
Information Administration, 2012). Historically, this kind of substitution effect between oil and
natural gas is expected, as it is easier to convert a natural gas plant to and from an oil plant than
to convert a natural gas plant to and from a coal plant.
In conclusion, many studies attempt to quantify residential and commercial demand into
determinants of different factors, the most important being income and price effects, weather and
seasonality, storage conditions, and fuel substitution effects (mainly oil). There have been many
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different studies analyzing regional demand for natural gas, as analysts hold views that aggregate
demand studies cannot test for regional variations in market conditions, especially with the
recently deregulated natural gas market where regional variations are quite high. The few
analyses of the spot market have shown the entire market as almost fully integrated, with the
West as slightly separated from the Central and Eastern parts of America.

II. 3. The Unconventional Natural Gas Industry
Unconventional natural gas resources are abundant in North America. According to an
assessment of the technically recoverable unconventional resources in North America, mainly
USA and Canada, there are 274 TCF (Trillion Cubic Feet) of recoverable natural gas from shale
reservoirs in North America (Pickering and Smead 2008). The number is large, showing that the
resource is clearly there, yet the economic nature of unconventional natural gas plays makes it
difficult for investment and adequate rates of return, problems that are necessary to address as we
continue to exploit these reserves in the coming decades.
According to the EIA, there are six types of unconventional natural gas plays, with some
being recently discovered. Deep natural gas is natural gas found deeper than conventional
drilling depths, requiring greater force and pressure in order to extract the natural gas. Tight
natural gas is gas stuck in a very tight geologic formation, more so than the average conventional
well. Tight natural gas is similar to shale gas in that both trap natural gas in rock that is highly
impermeable. Coalbed Methane (CBM) is natural gas trapped in coalbeds, in the fractures and on
the surface of coal. Known as a hazard to coal miners, capturing the natural gas within coal was
originally done to keep coal miners safe, but now commercial production has taken-off to the
point where it accounts for 10% of total natural gas production. Geopressurized Zones are
another unconventional natural gas resource, as natural gas is formed through underground
formations with high pressure rates. Natural gas is formed through the compression of clay
compress on top of porous material deep underground. Lastly, methane hydrates form natural gas
through pseudo-ice solids that form a mixture of natural gas and water. The exploration of this
type of natural gas reserve is still in the research phase, with reserves thought to be significant
but extraction processes quite unknown.
Unconventional gas plays are generally characterized by low geologic risk and higher
commercial risk. The low geologic risk is due to the smaller chance of a ‘dry hole,’ which is an
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unsuccessful well that produces no gas resources, than conventional wells. Shale gas wells
deplete much faster than conventional wells, as they exhibit an early peak followed by steady
decline. Shale wells experience a life of 8-12 years, while conventional wells have a life of 30-40
years (Stevens 2010).
The commercial risk is high because the wells typically require large capital costs, larger
than conventional wells, and investors typically need to wait some years after production to get
to a break-even stage and start to see profits. One study attempts to project production, capital
costs, and subsequent cash flow in a time series of shale gas plays, and concludes that there is a
wait of almost nine years until the average well breaks even and cash flow turns positive. The
average shale well in the study experienced a steep increase from year 2 through year 4, where it
hits the peak and then declines all the way through the rest of the life of the well. Lastly, the
analysis concludes an estimated 85% chance that shale gas plays would break even, portraying a
considerable amount of risk (Gray et al. 2007). With high capital costs and commercial
uncertainty from well to well, the total investment risk is decently large. The commercial risk
associated with these shale plays may be forcing natural gas operators into a bind.
…natural gas production from unconventional sources has become largely subeconomic over the past three years for a large portion of the US natural gas
operators. A majority of gas operators continues to outspend their net earnings on
CAPEX (Capital Expenditure) programs. They must do so, because of the shortlife cycle of unconventional gas wells. If they were to stop CAPEX (Capital
Expenditure) for new wells, free cash flow would dry up quickly. Low well
productivity data, together with high cost of recovery (well completion cost and
frac-jobs), low gas prices and drying up of access to new capital are the
underlying causes for lagging cash flow from unconventional wells (Weijermars
2011).
The analysis here notes that if there is a drop in projected net earnings, the burden will fall on
natural gas operators to cover this drop. With recent low prices, shale gas operators are having a
tough time finding investors, and analysts have gone as far to question whether a price-floor
policy is necessary to bail out the unconventional natural gas industry (Weijermars 2011).
These problems with the natural gas industry and unconventional commercial risk have
garnered recent pessimism with the projected rising shale gas industry. One analysis portrayed
the industry as “after the gold rush” (Berman 2012). Berman notes the large declining rates of
the biggest shale reserves, with the average Haynesville Shale well declining at 48%.
Meanwhile, standard conventional wells have declining rates of up to 20%. For the shale gas
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industry to meet projected growth expectations in the coming decades, the industry needs higher
gas prices. When comparing shale and conventional wells, there are clear differences in lifespan,
profiles, and declining rates. There are also geologic differences, mainly in terms of Estimated
Ultimate Recovery (EUR), where it is by and large well known that shale wells offers higher
EURs than conventional wells (Bahily 2011).

II. 4. Environmental Costs of Shale Gas Extraction
Despite the large amount of natural gas estimated in shale gas reservoirs, horizontal well
technology is a new technique. Environmentalists are quick to point out serious environmental
hazards, which have proven worrisome. Understanding the geologic nature of shale gas source
rock formations and the process of horizontal hydraulic fracturing will allow quantifications on
environmental costs.
Formations containing reserves of shale gas have been loosely called shale rock, though
many observe the formation as a mixture of organic, low-permeability rock material. Shale gas
that results from the formation is typically dry, although some do produce gas and water
mixtures that need to be separated. The rock is typically comprised of consolidated clay-sized
particles that were deposited as muds in low-energy depositional environments and are deposited
with rich organic matter, such as algae, plant and animal derived organic debris (Arthur 2008).
Clay sediments accumulate and compact as mud layers gradually become pressurized to form
shale rock.
The process of hydraulic fracturing creates permeability within the formation. The
fracturing can facilitate the flow of fluids through the source rock to extract natural gas. The
process involves first drilling vertically between 5000 and 12000 ft., and then drilling for a few
thousand feet (Rahm 2011). Steel casings are cemented into place to protect freshwater aquifers
that typically lie above the shale rock. High pressure pumping of the liquid mixture causes
fractures and cracks, to which clay and sand particulates act as “propping” agents, flowing in and
holding the fractures open. Once pumping of the fluids stops, the gas flows back through the
horizontal portion and then through the vertical portion of the well (Arthur 2008).
In a study of 68 private drinking water wells in northern Pennsylvania and New York,
high amounts of methane were claimed to be found within fracking sites (Holzman 2011). The
amounts of water needed for shale gas plays is immense and is estimated at up to 5 million
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gallons per well (EPA 2010). An estimated 15%-80% of wastewater is flown back through the
well, and proper disposal of this ‘flowback’ is crucial to mitigating effects of hydraulic fracturing
on local lands and water supplies. Pennsylvania passed the Marcellus Shale Bill in May of 2010,
enforcing a three year ban on hydraulic fracturing until more research has been done into shale
wastewater mitigation, and New York has taken a similar stance. Understanding the damage to
local water supplies and degrees of mitigation will be essential for future exploration of the
Marcellus Shale.
The additives to the water-sand mixture pumped into the ground makes up a majority of
the worry associated with hydraulic fracturing, most of which are essential for successful shale
gas plays. A Hydrochloric acid mixture is utilized at the beginning of the shale gas play to clean
up the area. Corrosion inhibitors are also used in engineering simulations that test wells for
productivity. Biocides are used to make sure bacterial corrosion does not happen in the wellbore,
because fracture fluids are typically containing organic materials that provide a nice medium for
bacteria growth. Fracking fluids are known to contain more than 99% water, however drilling
companies are not required to disclose the other chemicals they use during the process. Other
chemicals that have been used are said to be potassium chloride, guar gum, ethylene glycol,
sodium carbonate, potassium carbonate, sodium chloride, borate salts, citric acid, glutaraldehyde,
or isopropanol (Rahm 2011). Although these added chemicals are mostly noted as non-toxic by
proponents of hydraulic fracturing (Vaugn and Pursell 2010), it is vital to mitigate the potential
for chemicals to leak into local grounds.
Disposal of wastewater can be done directly into land or involve deep-injection into
surface waters, depending on the location of the wellhead (Rahm 2011). Improper mitigation has
caused serious environmental opposition in Pennsylvania, most notably in Clearfield County,
Dunkard Creek, Monongahala River, Hopewell Township, and Dimcock (Vaughn and Pursell
2010). As a global leader in oil and natural gas production, it is obvious to turn to Texas to
understand exactly how they have handled water issues surrounding hydraulic fracturing. A case
study on shale gas production in Texas shows little environmental regulation here.
Texas…does not have centralized administrative structure for managing
environmental regulation. Multiple commissions and authorities have a role to
play in jurisdiction over mineral, water, air, and land regulation. But…Texas does
not have a strong ethos of environmental protectionism. Moreover, under the
leadership of Governor Rick Perry, Texas has taken a decidedly anti-EPA and
anti-federal regulation position (Rahm 2011).
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The Texas Railroad Commission regulates the oil and gas industry and has conflicted with the
EPA due to relaxed enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The Railroad Commission
allows drilling companies to use as much groundwater as they want (Texas Railroad
Commission, 2013) and the state thrives from the industry. In general, wastewater control has
shown itself as a problem in Texas. For example, when finding flammables present in drinking
water, the EPA declared an Imminent and Substantial Endangerment Order in December 2010 to
protect waters in Southern Parker County, located next to Barnett shale wellheads. The federal
government will most likely continue to clash with local authorities in Texas.
Costs to mitigate flowback brought by hydraulic fracturing are essential to understanding
the possible exploration of the Marcellus Shale. The Marcellus Shale is noted as a large shale gas
basin that has barely been explored and extracted. In the near future this will likely change, as
the emergence of successful plays around the United States and the ever-growing demand of
energy will put pressure on local Northeast leaders to drill. Responsible price scenarios for
extraction and environmental mitigation of flowback wastewater will be imperative to analyzing
whether to drill in certain Marcellus areas.
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Chapter III. Data Description and Methodology
In this chapter, data series and methodologies are explained in detail. The data is two-fold
with shale gas production and gas spot price data gathered. For shale production, raw datasets of
shale production according to lease number was extracted from the Drilling Info database and
was aggregated to form three variables for each shale play: the total gas produced in a month, the
count of flowing wells in each month, and the average gas produced per lease number in each
month. Meanwhile, weekly spot price data was accessed through the Intelligence Press. Through
developing ARDL (Autoregressive Distributed Lag) Models, granger causality tests were
analyzed between production and prices in both causality directions.
III. 1. Data Series
III. 1 Shale Gas Production
Monthly, aggregated shale gas production for seven major shale plays from the Drilling
Info database was gathered. Each shale play has three different measures of production: the
average gas produced by lease per month, the number of flowing wells per month, and the total
gas produced by month. A lease refers to a number of flowing wells that a specific company may
hold at a given time. The seven shale plays were the Barnett Shale in north-central Texas, the
Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, the Woodford Shale in Oklahoma, the Eagle Ford Shale in
southern Texas, the Bakken Shale in west North Dakota and east Montana, the Haynesville Shale
in east Texas and west Louisiana, and the Marcellus Shale in New York, Pennsylvania, West
Virginia, and Ohio. The monthly data starts when horizontal drilling begins for that particular
shale play, which is different for each shale play.
Total gas produced per month is compiled and shown in a scatter-plot (Figure 3-1). The
Barnett Shale is denoted BAR Sum starts with exploratory wells in 1996. Consistent increases
pick up in late 2003, where it rises consistently until mid-2008. The rate of increase slows to the
end of the series and reaches the highest point in December of 2011, at roughly 168.5 million
MCF. The Barnett is clearly the most developed shale reservoir in the country. Meanwhile, the
Fayetteville is denoted FAY Sum in the key and starts production in September 2004, increasing
consistently in January 2006 through 2012. Woodford shale plays start in 2005 and are denoted
Wood Sum. This series increases in 2008 through 2010, where it gradually increases to a high of
about 21.8 million MCF (almost 13 times less than the highest total in the Barnett shale). The
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Bakken shale is barely visible when plotting with the Barnett play and is denoted BAK sum. We
see its movement more clearly in the Appendix, as in March 2006 wellheads increase production
fairly rapidly until late 2007, where production remains relatively steady until another increases
in June 2011 through 2012, reaching a high of roughly 0.913 million MCF in August 2012. The
Haynesville shale starts production in 2008, denoted HAY sum, and starts a steady increase in
February 2009, reaching a high of 63.51 million MCF in May 2012 before starting to taper off.
The Eagle Ford shale gets similarly dwarfed as the Bakken shale, denoted as EF Sum. This series
can be viewed in the Appendix, and starts production in June 2008, with a steady increase
starting in October 2009, until reaching a maximum of 13.69 million MCF in October 2011 and
tailing off into 2012. Lastly, the Marcellus shale, denoted Mar Sum, starts production in
November 2008 and increases exponentially through the end of the series in June 2012. Unlike
other shale plays, the Marcellus did not taper off, as wells were simply halted in June.

Figure 3-1. Total Gas per Month for all seven shale plays. Note BAR Sum = Barnett total
production by month; FAY Sum = Fayetteville total production by month; WOOD Sum =
Woodford total production by month; BAK Sum = Bakken total production by month; MAR Sum
= Marcellus total production by month; HAYN Sum = Haynesville total production by month; EF
Sum = Eagle Ford total production by month
A logarithmic scatter plot of well count shows exactly when the seven shale series
increased, and the various shale plays follow a similar profile to the total gas per month series
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(Figure 3-2). The logarithmic scale, with a base of 20 depicts when each play started production
and wells sprang up. Without the log scale, the Barnett series dwarfs all aggregated well counts,
as this reservoir hits highs over 13000 flowing wells per month, while the next-highest
Fayetteville hits highs to over 4000, and the other plays fail to get higher than 1000 flowing
wells per month.
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Figure 3-2. Flowing Well Count per shale play. Note BAR WellCount = Barnett flowing wells
per month; FAY WellCount = Fayetteville flowing wells per month; WOOD WellCount =
Woodford flowing wells per month; BAK WellCount = Bakken flowing wells per month; MAR
WellCount = Marcellus flowing wells per month; HAYN WellCount = Haynesville flowing wells
per month; EF WellCount = Eagle Ford flowing wells per month
Average gas per lease number per month is compiled in an XY scatter plot (Figure 3-3).
The Barnett and Fayetteville are some of the lowest because these reservoirs have high well
counts, while the Haynesville, Marcellus, and Eagle Ford plays are some of the highest because
they have low well counts. Barnett averages increases in 2005-2006 and taper off through the
series, reaching a high in July 2005 with 24.3 thousand MCF per aggregated lease. Average
Fayetteville leases increase rapidly in 2006 and slowly decline in 2009, after a high of 26.2
thousand MCF. Average Woodford leases are erratic, but increase to a high of roughly 57
thousand MCF in November 2008 where it then declines through temporal spikes. Bakken
averages are consistently low but see a one month increase to 913 thousand MCF, where a few
leases were very successful. Marcellus averages hit the highest of any shale play, with an
average of roughly 83439 MCF per lease in October 2010. Haynesville averages are high as
well, hitting a high of roughly 78590 MCF per lease number in August 2011. Lastly, the Eagle
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Ford shale averages hit highs in June 2010 and January 2011, where average lease production
hits at least 63000 MCF.
Source:
DI
Desktop
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Figure 3-3. Average production per lease number per month. Note BAR Average = Barnett
average lease production per month; FAY Average = Fayetteville average lease production per
month; WOOD Average = Woodford average lease production per month; BAK Average =
Bakken average lease production per month; MAR Average = Marcellus average lease production
per month; HAYN Average = Haynesville average lease production per month; EF Average =
Eagle Ford average lease production per month
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III. 1. 2. Regional Gas Prices
The second data series that was used is the weekly spot price data series for seven
different spot locations from the Intelligence Press National Gas Index (NGI). All seven series
start on July 7, 2003 and end on January 21, 2013. These seven different spots are the Henry Hub
spot in southern Louisiana, the El Paso Permian spot in east Texas, the Rocky Mountain spot
price, also known as Opal, in north Wyoming, the Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) city-gate in
west California, the SoCal spot price located in southern California, the Transco Zone 6 New
York spot price located in New York City, and the Algonquin city-gate located in Massachusetts.
The seven spots are dispersed well enough to hit three regions in the United States, with the east
and west coast represented, and the South, the heart of domestic natural gas production, is well
represented with two spots, while the Opal is the lone Midwest spot.
Seven spots and their price movements through the monthly time series is shown in a line
graph (Figure 3-4). The Opal price series reaches lows in 2007 and falls significantly away from
the rest of the series for about ten months before coming back. Other than this hiccup, these price
series seem to be integrated and could be used to loosely test the Law of One Price rule.
However, this test would be weak as there are only seven spots and the geographic market is not
well represented throughout.

Figure 3-4. Weekly Spot Location Price Series. Note: CALPGCC = California PG&E spot;
CALSSOCAL = Southern California spot; NEAALGCG = New England Algonquin spot;
NEATZ6NY = Transco Zone 6 New York; RMTOPAL = Rocky Mountain Opal spot;
SLAHH = Southern Louisiana Henry Hub spot; WTXEPP = West Texas El Paso Permian spot
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III. 2. Methodology
The analysis attempts to quantify the geographic downstream market for natural gas and
the ways in which wellhead production from horizontal drilling influences prices. Cointegration
is used to describe two or more series that have similar linear movements. Cointegration occurs
when two or more series generates a linear combination such that there is a stationary process in
which the said series drifts in a similar way. Furthermore, tests for causality can observe which
series drifts first and causes the other series to move similarly. The specific degree of causality
that a spot price would have on a shale gas production level, or that a shale gas production level
would have on a spot price will let us analyze how different regions of supply and demand affect
each other within a time series. The rationale could be made for both price to significantly
influence quantity and quantity to significantly influence price. An increase in price would make
investing in gas production more favorable, and an increase in gas production might cause prices
to drop, although the recent economic recession could be at play as well. This level of thought is
the basis for the test, with the goal to quantify the degree of market integration between regions
of gas production and prices.
Significant causality relationships between time-series data can be analyzed through the
use of an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. The model runs an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression with time lags on the variables in the estimation. Based on the Koyck
Lag Structure to quantify geometric effects of past on current events, Figure 3-5 shows an
example of the derivation of an ARDL model from a distributed lag model.
(1) BAR_AVERAGEt = c + 0CALPGCCt + 0CALPGCCt-1 + 1CALSSOCALt + 1CALSSOCALt-1 + ut
(2) BAR_AVERAGEt-1 = c + 0CALPGCCt-1 + 0 2CALPGCCt-2 + 1CALSSOCALt-1 + 12CALSSOCALt-2
(3) BAR_AVERAGEt-1 = c + 02CALPGCCt-1 + 0 3CALPGCCt-2 + 12CALSSOCALt-1 +
13CALSSOCALt-2
(4) BAR_AVERAGEt - BAR_AVERAGEt-1 = c(1-) + 0CALPGCCt + CALSSOCALt + (ut - ut-1)
(5) BAR_AVERAGEt = c(1-) + BAR_AVERAGEt-1 + 0CALPGCCt + CALSSOCALt + (ut - ut-1)

Figure 3-5. Example of the derivation of an ARDL model
For simplicity, this ARDL model only used one lag and one lag interval. The analysis
performed in the next chapter uses 12 lags as recommended for monthly data, and anywhere
from one to four intervals. The ARDL model in Figure 3-5 is run with the dependent variable
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BAR_AVERAGEt, the average Barnett shale gas production per lease number series, and
independent variables CALPGCCt, the California PG&C price series, and CALSSOCALt, the
California SoCal price series, with 0 and 1 as coefficients, c as a constant, and  as the
geometric rate of decline. The steps taken to generate equation (5) was to start with equation (1)
as a distributed lag model with rate of decline  substituted in, to then lag the model by one
period to get equation (2), to multiply both sides of equation (2) by rate of decline , and then
subtracting equation (3) from (1) to get the ARDL model (4). Equation (5) is equal to equation
(4) but is rewritten to have dependent variable BAR_AVERAGEt alone on the right-side. The
analysis uses up to four lag intervals, and the number of intervals was selected with the use of
optimal lag-length criteria, selected with a combination of the Hannon-Quinn, Akaike
Information Criterion, and Schwartz criterion methods, which take collinearity and other
statistical problems with estimators into account when choosing the optimal lag structure for a
given ARDL model specification (Hacker and Hatemi-J 2008; Lütkepohl 1985).
Through the constructing of many different ARDL models, similar to the one shown in
equation (5), the analysis matched a shale production series with all price series to test for
causation. Granger causality tests are cointegration tests that prove significant causality within a
geographic market. These tests analyze whether a variable X can cause another variable Y when
forecasting of current value of Y can be improved by using information on past values of X.
Granger causality tests involves using lagged values of X to explain movement in the current
value of Y, and when Yt can be predicted better by using past values of X, there is Granger
causality. Furthermore, when bidirectional Granger causality exists there is said to be feedback
between the two variables (Doane and Spulber 1994; Granger 1969).
Testing for Granger causality with shale gas production data requires two adjustments to
the price series. The first adjustment is required because the natural gas production data series
was monthly while the spot price series was weekly. Statistical analyses for causality cannot be
done if all variables do not have the same period. The spot price series was converted from
weekly to monthly to match the time series of the production data. This conversion involved
taking the average of three or four weekly data points in one given month and using this average
as a monthly series. The second adjustment was made because the price data was dependent on
the season, as prices consistently peaked in the winter and dipped during the summer.
Meanwhile, the production data is not seasonal, and thus taking away this effect was necessary to
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match the two databases. The seasonal adjustment used is known as the X-11-ARIMA seasonal
adjustment method. This method is known to reduce about 30% in the bias of 20% in the
absolute value of the total error in the seasonal factor forecasts for the 12 months, and when
corresponding to peaks and troughs this reduction is larger (Dagum 2005).
Residual tests for ARDL estimators were performed to check if the estimators
represented were the best linear, unbiased estimators. The Portmanteau and Lagrange Multiplier
tests were used to check for autocorrelations, with the desire to accept null hypothesis that the
estimator residuals had no serial correlation up to lag k. Autocorrelations result in the estimated
coefficients not having the minimum variance among all estimates and are inefficient.
Significance in these tests suggests that the error terms, also known as residuals, are closely
related (Hosking 1980; Peña and Rodríguez 2002). Meanwhile, the White test was used to test
for heteroskedasticity, which tests for patterns and whether or not degrees of finite variance exist
or the estimators are completely random (White 1980). Lastly, Jarque-Bera normality tests were
used, testing kurtosis and skewness to check whether data matches that of a normal distribution
(Thadewad and Büning 2004).

III. 3. Hypotheses
The hypotheses prior to the analysis were based on two key factors. Firstly, the natural
gas pipeline network infrastructure relative to shale play and spot price locations was taken into
account. Recall Figure 1-3, which showed the national gas pipeline layout. Observations
pertaining to this map will lend an idea as to how wellheads from certain regions can affect the
spot price in another region. A specific shale play should require more lag intervals to affect a
price series geographically farther away

as opposed to one that is geographically closer.

Secondly, a specific shale play’s amount of gas and length of production time will likely have an
impact on how significant it reacts with regional price series.
The Barnett Shale has been a leading gas source for America in recent years and this fact
alone should allow Barnett production to cause feedback (granger causality both ways) with
most spot prices. El Paso Permian and the Henry Hub spot prices are particularly good bets for
causality because of their close proximity to the Barnett shale. The pipelines to the California
spots-PG&C and SoCal-to Texas seem direct and cointegration could come here as well.
Production from the Woodford shale in Oklahoma is also extensive and causality could be seen
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for most spot prices. The El Paso Permian spot is very close is the best bet for feedback, while
pipelines out of Oklahoma seem relatively direct to the Northeast and the West so cointegration
could be expected here. The Henry Hub and Opal spots do not seem directly connected through
pipelines with the Woodford and causality is not expected here. The Haynesville shale has been
developed considerably in the past few years and feedback could be expected with multiple
spots. The Henry Hub is the best bet for causality based upon close location to these shale plays,
however the Northeast spots and the Opal could see integration with relatively direct lines to
these regions.
The Fayetteville shale has been developed considerably, and the Henry Hub is the closest
and should have causality. The northeast spots are also good candidates, as the piping from
Arkansas to New York seems adequate. Bakken shale production has not reached high levels,
and thus the expectation is that no causality will occur with spot prices. The Opal price series is
the closest to these shale plays and has the best chance at causality, but just based off sheer lack
of production, this is unlikely. The Eagle Ford shale production in south Texas has been steady
in recent years and could interact with the El Paso Permian and Henry Hub spots, which are both
close to these wellheads. Piping infrastructure shows itself relatively direct from south Texas to
the Northeast and West, and given more lag intervals, significant causality could show here as
well. The Opal spot seems a bit too far to feel an effect from the Eagle Ford. The Marcellus
production was relatively extensive for a year and a half, and despite a short time series it should
exhibit causality with the two Northeast spots with one or two lag intervals. As stated previously,
spot prices tend to move in a similar fashion with the exception of the Opal spot price which
drifts lower than other price series in 2007. Through observing significant causality relationships
with different shale plays, we may be able to discuss how supply altered this price series with
respect to the others.
The question of which type of aggregated shale data series will Granger cause prices and
which types will be Granger caused by prices is interesting to note. The count of flowing wells
and total production in a given month should be Granger caused by prices more often. Prices
dictate whether or not it is feasible to invest and build more wells and get subsequent more
production. These two data series matched the movements of one another and it would be
expected for them to test significant and insignificant in a somewhat similar fashion. Meanwhile,
the average natural gas per lease number is a bit more complex category and may granger cause
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prices. This variable depicts good and bad performance of natural gas wellheads in a particular
month, which could bleed through the gas market with more efficiency than the other two
production variables.
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Chapter IV. Results and Discussion
ARDL models are generated for a specific shale play series variable (i.e. Woodford
Average), and different spot price series. Results showed a large degree of causality with both
shale production to spot prices and spot prices to shale production, although the former
relationship was found significant more often than the latter. Two-way granger causality, known
as feedback, was found for sixteen different relationships. With regards to the hypothesis, some
significance hit where it was expected while other times significance hit where it wasn’t
expected.

IV. 1. Results
Granger tests for causality were run from various ARDL models, and significant
relationships are summarized in Table 1. Note that the table has two variables in every row, the
first being the dependent variable and the second being a variable that was said to Granger cause
the dependent variable given a certain number of lags and intervals. In total, there were 100
significant Granger causalities among 278 different combinations of Granger directions between
a given spot price series and a given shale production series, a 36% chance of significance.
Table 4-1. Summary of granger causality tests with 12 lags chosen. Note the direction of granger
causality “Dependent variable is GRANGER CAUSED by other variable.” Number of lag
intervals and P-values showing significance listed.
Dependent Variable
Wyoming Opal
Eagle Ford Sum
Eagle Ford Sum
PG&C CA
Transco Zone 6 NY
SoCal CA
Transco Zone 6 NY
Haynesville Average
Transco Zone 6 NY
Haynesville Average
Transco Zone 6 NY
SoCal CA
Transco Zone 6 NY
Algonquin Citygate MA
PG&C CA

Granger
Causing
Variable
Haynesville Average
Transco Zone 6 NY
Algonquin Citygate MA
Haynesville Average
Haynesville Average
Haynesville Average
Marcellus Average
PG&C CA
Fayetteville Well Count
SoCal CA
Fayetteville Sum
Woodford Average
Eagle Ford Well Count
Haynesville Average
Woodford Well Count

Number
Intervals
4
3
3
3
4
3
1
3
1
3
1
1
4
4
1

of

Lag P-Value
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0001***
0.0002***
0.0006***
0.0012***
0.0014***
0.0014***
0.0018***
0.0019***
0.0020***
0.0021***
0.0023***
0.0036***
0.0036***
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Dependent Variable

Granger
Causing Number
Variable
Intervals
Paso Fayetteville Well Count
1

West Texas El
Permian
West Texas El Paso
Permian
PG&C CA
Fayetteville Average
Wyoming Opal
Algonquin Citygate MA
Woodford Average
Barnett Average

Woodford Well Count

Woodford Sum
PG&C CA
Barnett Well Count
Marcellus Average
SoCal CA
West Texas El Paso
Permian
Barnett Average
Southern
Louisiana
Henry Hub
Southern Louisiana Henry Woodford Well Count
Hub
West Texas El Paso Fayetteville Sum
Permian
SoCal CA
Woodford Sum
SoCal CA
Woodford Well Count
Algonquin Citygate MA
Bakken Average
Transco Zone 6 NY
Woodford Well Count
Southern Louisiana Henry Fayetteville Well Count
Hub
Fayetteville Average
SoCal CA
Transco Zone 6 NY
Barnett Average
Algonquin Citygate MA
Woodford Average
Eagle Ford Well Count
Transco Zone 6 NY
Fayetteville Average
Southern
Louisiana
Henry Hub
Algonquin Citygate MA
Fayetteville Sum
PG&C CA
Woodford Average
West Texas El Paso Eagle Ford Well Count
Permian
West Texas El Paso Barnett Average
Permian
Algonquin Citygate MA
Woodford Sum
PG&C CA
Fayetteville Sum
West Texas El Paso Bakken Average
Permian
Woodford Average
PG&C CA
Wyoming Opal
Barnett Average
Algonquin Citygate MA
Woodford Well Count
Southern Louisiana Henry Fayetteville Sum
Hub

of

Lag P-Value
0.0042***

1

0.0043***

1
3
4
1
1
3

0.0045***
0.0049***
0.0057***
0.0063***
0.0070***
0.0072***

3

0.0075***

1

0.0080***

1

0.0087***

1
1
2
1
1

0.0087***
0.0092***
0.0093***
0.0098***
0.0102**

3
1
1
4
3

0.0107**
0.0108**
0.0112**
0.0130**
0.0134**

1
1
2

0.0138**
0.0141**
0.0144**

3

0.0145**

1
1
3

0.0150**
0.0156**
0.0157**

1
2
1
1

0.0158**
0.0170**
0.0173**
0.0177**
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Dependent Variable

Granger
Causing Number
Variable
Intervals
Woodford Sum
1
Paso Barnett Sum
3

Transco Zone 6 NY
West Texas El
Permian
SoCal CA
Algonquin Citygate MA
Southern Louisiana Henry
Hub
Southern Louisiana Henry
Hub
SoCal CA
PG&C CA
Eagle Ford Well Count
PG&C CA
Haynesville Average
Transco Zone 6 NY
Southern Louisiana Henry
Hub
Haynesville Average
Algonquin Citygate MA
Southern Louisiana Henry
Hub
Transco Zone 6 NY
Transco Zone 6 NY
SoCal CA
Transco Zone 6 NY
West Texas El Paso
Permian
Fayetteville Average

of

Lag P-Value
0.0181**
0.0191**

Barnett Average
Fayetteville Well Count
Haynesville Well Count

1
1
1

0.0201**
0.0212**
0.0227**

Barnett Average

3

0.0237**

Fayetteville Sum
Eagle Ford Well Count
Algonquin Citygate MA
Fayetteville Well Count
Transco Zone 6 NY
Marcellus Well Count
Woodford Sum

1
2
4
1
4
1
3

0.0238**
0.0251**
0.0267**
0.0268**
0.0275**
0.0277**
0.0277**

Algonquin Citygate MA
Barnett Average
Eagle Ford Well Count

4
1
2

0.0279**
0.0287**
0.0293**

Bakken Average
Marcellus Sum
Bakken Average
Woodford Average
Haynesville Well Count

2
1
3
1
1

0.0294**
0.0323**
0.0352**
0.0363**
0.0376**

3

0.0444**

1

0.0458**

3
1
1
4
3

0.0475**
0.0487**
0.0492**
0.0518*
0.0546*

1
2

0.0562*
0.0609*

1

0.0613*

1
1

0.0623*
0.0637*

West Texas El Paso
Permian
Haynesville Average
West Texas El Paso
Permian
Algonquin Citygate MA
Eagle Ford Sum
SoCal CA
Fayetteville Well Count
Haynesville Well Count
Algonquin Citygate MA
Woodford Average
Wyoming Opal
Southern Louisiana Henry Bakken Average
Hub
Marcellus Well Count
PG&C CA
Southern Louisiana Henry Haynesville Well Count
Hub
Eagle Ford Sum
West Texas El Paso
Permian
Haynesville Well Count
Transco Zone 6 NY
Eagle Ford Sum
SoCal CA
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Dependent Variable

Granger
Causing Number
of
Lag
Variable
Intervals
Algonquin Citygate MA
Barnett Well Count
2
West Texas El Paso Woodford Average
2
Permian
Transco Zone 6 NY
Haynesville Sum
1
SoCal CA
Eagle Ford Well Count
2
Haynesville Sum
Algonquin Citygate MA
1
Woodford Average
West Texas El Paso 2
Permian
PG&C CA
Barnett Well Count
2
Eagle Ford Sum
PG&C CA
1
Transco Zone 6 NY
Haynesville Well Count
1
West Texas El Paso Woodford Sum
3
Permian
Haynesville Sum
Transco Zone 6 NY
1
Southern Louisiana Henry Eagle Ford Sum
1
Hub
West Texas El Paso Eagle Ford Sum
1
Permian
Haynesville Average
Southern
Louisiana 1
Henry Hub
Woodford Well Count
SoCal CA
1
Wyoming Opal
Fayetteville Sum
1
Eagle Ford Sum
Southern
Louisiana 1
Henry Hub
PG&C CA
Barnett Average
1
SoCal CA
Barnett Sum
1
Wyoming Opal
Fayetteville Well Count
1
Note: *=statistically significant at the 10% level **=statistically significant
Statistically significant at the 1% level.

P-Value
0.0662*
0.0674*
0.0677*
0.0678*
0.0686*
0.0704*
0.0705*
0.0726*
0.0728*
0.0732*
0.0754*
0.0765*
0.0793*
0.0803*
0.0819*
0.0820*
0.0827*
0.0860*
0.0949*
0.0951*
at the 5% level; *** =

Table 2 shows relationships where Granger causality is found significant between two
variables in both causality directions, a phenomenon known as feedback. Note that P-values are
shown in either direction, showing the level of significance that each causality direction held.
Table 4-2. 16 significant feedback relationships, two-way granger causality between variables.
Dependent Variable
Eagle Ford Sum
Algonquin Citygate MA
Haynesville Average
Algonquin Citygate MA
Barnett Average

Granger
Causing
Variable
Algonquin Citygate MA
Eagle Ford Sum
Algonquin Citygate MA
Haynesville Average
Southern
Louisiana
Henry Hub

Number
Intervals
3
3
4
4
3

of

Lag P-Value
0.0001***
0.0475**
0.0279**
0.0036***
0.0075***
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Dependent Variable

Granger
Causing Number
Variable
Intervals
Southern Louisiana Henry Barnett Average
3
Hub
Barnett Average
West Texas El Paso 3
Permian
West Texas El Paso Barnett Average
3
Permian
Eagle Ford Sum
Algonquin Citygate MA
3
Algonquin Citygate MA
Eagle Ford Sum
3
Eagle Ford Sum
Southern
Louisiana 1
Henry Hub
Southern Louisiana Henry Eagle Ford Sum
1
Hub
Eagle Ford Sum
West Texas El Paso 1
Permian
West Texas El Paso Eagle Ford Sum
1
Permian
Eagle Ford Well Count
Transco Zone 6 NY
4
Transco Zone 6 NY
Eagle Ford Well Count
4
Haynesville Average
Algonquin Citygate MA
4
Algonquin Citygate MA
Haynesville Average
4
Haynesville Average
PG&C CA
3
PG&C CA
Haynesville Average
3
Haynesville Average
SoCal CA
3
SoCal CA
Haynesville Average
3
Haynesville Well Count
Transco Zone 6 NY
1
Transco Zone 6 NY
Haynesville Well Count
1
Haynesville Sum
Transco Zone 6 NY
1
Transco Zone 6 NY
Haynesville Sum
1
West Texas El Paso Woodford Average
2
Permian
Woodford Average
West Texas El Paso 2
Permian
PG&C CA
Woodford Average
1
Woodford Average
PG&C CA
1
Woodford Average
SoCal CA
1
SoCal CA
Woodford Average
1
Woodford Well Count
SoCal CA
1
SoCal CA
Woodford Well Count
1

of

Lag P-Value
0.0237**
0.0072***
0.0145**
0.0001***
0.0475**
0.0827*
0.0765*
0.0613*
0.0793*
0.0130**
0.0023***
0.0279**
0.0036***
0.0014***
0.0002***
0.0019***
0.0012***
0.0623*
0.0728*
0.0754*
0.0677*
0.0674*
0.0704*
0.0141**
0.0158**
0.0070***
0.0021***
0.0819*
0.0092***

Table 3 summarizes the different ways that the price granger caused the three types of
shale production variables-average gas, total gas, and well count-and shale production granger
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caused the price. Despite shale production causing price more often more, prices did granger
cause average well performance fifteen times.
Table 4-3. Summary table of Granger Causation Tests
Granger Causation
Price
GRANGER
CAUSING
Total
Production
Price
GRANGER
CAUSING
Average
Production
Price
GRANGER
CAUSING Well Count
Total
Production
GRANGER
CAUSING
Price
Average
Production
GRANGER
CAUSING
Price
Well Count GRANGER
CAUSING Price

Significant relationship
9

Average Significance
0.0552*

Average Lag Intervals
1.444444444

15

0.0274**

2.6

7

0.0424**

2.142857143

19

0.0364**

1.4

23

0.0203917**

2.125

25

0.029353846**

1.5

Two bar graphs are shown below, with Figure 4-1 representing the number of times a
shale play variables significantly granger caused a price while Figure 4-2 shows the number of
times a price significantly granger caused a shale play variable.

Production 'Granger Cause' Amount
Woodford
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Haynesville
Bakken
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Figure 4-1. Chart outlining amount in which individual aggregated shale production data granger
caused a price series.
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Price Granger Significance Amount
Opal-WY
HH-LA
EPP-TX
SoCal-CA
PG&C-CA
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Algonquin-MA
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Figure 4-2. Chart outlining amount in which regional prices were found significant in a granger
causality relationship, with both flow directions. Note: Opal-WY: Opal Spot; HH-LA: Henry
Hub spot; EPP-TX: El Paso Permian spot; SoCal-CA: Southern California spot; PG&C-CA:
PG&C California spot; Transco-NY: Transco Zone 6 NY spot; Algonquin-MA: Algonquin citygate spot.
The Barnett average gas series Granger caused all seven spot prices at the 5-10%
significance level. The series was significant with only one lag interval for east and west spot
prices, two intervals with the Opal spot, and three intervals for the two south spots. Meanwhile,
Barnett well count and total gas variables were less significant, Granger causing the Opal price
series at 1% significance with 4 intervals, and caused the El Paso Permian series at 3%
significance with 3 intervals., and three other causalities at 10%. The Fayetteville well count and
total gas series data were highly significant, Granger causing NY and El Paso Permian spots at
1% significance and the Henry Hub, Massachusetts, and both California spots at 5% significance
and all with just one lag interval. The Fayetteville average gas series was insignificant to Granger
cause any price series, but both California and the Henry Hub spots Granger caused this series
with 3 lag intervals. No feedback occurred with the Fayetteville shale. The Haynesville average
gas series Granger caused the Opal and both Northeast spots with 4 lag intervals, and the two
California price series with 3 lag intervals, all at 1% significance. The series exhibited feedback
with California spots and Massachusetts spot series. The Southern spot prices were Granger
caused by the Haynesville average series with one lag interval at 5-10% significance.
Haynesville well count Granger caused the Southern spots at 5% significance with 1 lag interval.
Woodford production data significantly Granger caused all price series except for the Opal. The
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average gas series Granger caused both Northeast spots and both California spots with one lag
interval at levels of 1-5% significance, and Granger caused the El Paso Permian spot with two
intervals at 10% significance. The total gas and well count series Granger caused six out of seven
spot prices, with Northeast and California spots again with one interval and at 1-5% significance,
while the Henry Hub and El Paso Permian showed various significance. The Woodford average
series exhibited feedback with the El Paso Permian spot at two lag intervals and the two
California spots at one lag interval. Feedback also showed between the Woodford well count
series and the SoCal spot price, with one lag interval.
The Bakken and Marcellus production series made the least significance in the analysis.
The Bakken average shale series showed significance to Granger cause the Massachusetts and
New York spot prices with 1% and 5% significance respectively with two lag intervals, the El
Paso and SoCal spot prices with three lag intervals at 5% significance and the Henry Hub at 10%
significance with three lag intervals as well. Well count and total gas variables failed to
significantly interact with any price series. The Marcellus average shale series Granger caused
both Northeast spot prices at 1% significance with one lag interval, while the total gas production
and well count variables Granger caused the NY spot at 5% significance with one lag interval.
Of the 16 feedback relationships shown in Table 2, eight of them were based on the
average gas production per month, five were based on the total gas production per month, and
three were based off the well count per month. Table 3 summarizes how the three production
variables interacted with price data, with average P-value at 5% significance for all but a price
series granger causing total production series. The most significant relationships came from well
count and average production Granger causing price, with total production not far behind. The
summary here shows how causality mostly moved from production series on the price series,
although, as described above, there were significant causality flows from prices to production as
well. There were 31 relationships that had price granger cause production, while there were 67
relationships that had production granger cause prices.
Figure 4-1 shows that the Woodford was found significant 17 times in causality flows,
followed by the Fayetteville at 14, the Barnett at 12, the Haynesville at 10, the Eagle Ford at 8,
the Bakken at 5, and the Marcellus at 4. This is what was expected, as the most developed, oldest
shale plays, the Woodford, the Fayetteville, and Barnett found the significant the most times.
There were more observations with these plays compared to other, less developed shales, and
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thus a more detailed, less biased dataset. Meanwhile, Figure 4-2 shows the amount individual
price series were significant in Granger tests, in either causality direction. The Transco Zone 6
had the most significant Granger relationships, at 19, while the Algonquin city-gate, the El Paso
Permian, the SoCal spot, the PG&C and Henry Hub were no more than 5 relationships behind.
The Opal was far back with just 6 significant causality relationships, which was expected.

IV. 2. Discussion
Overall, tests for Granger causality between production and price data came back as
highly significant when taking into account relatively small sample size of spot prices. The most
developed shale plays in the gas production series were the Barnett, Fayetteville, Woodford, and
Haynesville shale reservoirs, and it is not a coincidence that these shales were the biggest players
in causality analyses between shale production and prices either. With regards to the impact of
the three different production variables-well count, total production, and average-the largest
statistical impact was felt with the average production per lease number in a given month. The
Haynesville Barnett, Fayetteville and Woodford averages all were highly correlated with the
different regional gas prices.
The lag structure had a great impact on the significance of different causality
relationships. The hypothesis was made that shale plays would need more lag intervals to
significantly cause spot prices geographically farther away. This theory held with some plays and
didn’t for others. Average Haynesville wellhead production, in east Texas and west Louisiana,
significantly caused West and Northeast spots with 3-4 lag intervals, and average Marcellus
wellhead production, in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, New York, and Ohio, significantly caused
Northeast spots with just one interval. However, the Arkansas Fayetteville well count and total
gas variables significantly caused all price series with only one interval, disproving the theory.
When lags and geography do not match up, pipeline infrastructure should be noted, as the
pipelines from the Fayetteville to the Northeast and West spots seem very direct.
The Opal spot price was in an interesting geographic location. The price data was
organized in a way in which there was two series from the East, two from the West, two from the
South, and Opal was ‘on an island.’ As seen in Figure 3-4, Opal breaks away from the rest of the
series in 2007 when prices drop to very low levels. Thus, the Opal price series was not integrated
with the general price trend. The original hypothesis held that the Opal was the most likely to
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hold significance with Bakken shale production, as they are close geographically. This turned out
not to be the case, as the Bakken performed poorly in most causality tests. The Opal did have
1% significance as being Granger caused by the average shale production from the Haynesville
shale, which potentially points to this region obtaining their gas from this reservoir, as
fluctuations in aggregated well performance from the Haynesville shale lowered Opal spot
prices.
The Eagle Ford shale well count and sum variables were highly significant in the analysis
as well. These production series and the Northeast spot prices had significant feedback between
them with 3-4 lag intervals. The relationship here is important to note, as south Texas production
is shipped out to the Northeast and with adequate time lags this relationship came through very
significant to affect both prices and production in these areas. Eagle Ford well count and sum
also had feedback with Texas and Louisiana spot prices with one lag interval, which stresses the
importance of gas production to the local regions as well. However, the average Eagle Ford
series performed very poorly in causality tests, not showing significance with any price series.
Looking back at the series, it shows temporal spikes and is relatively random, thus not surprising
that it did not interact with price series data significantly.
Most importantly, despite relatively low levels of production from the Marcellus shale,
the reservoir did significantly impact prices in both of the Northeast spots with only one lag
interval, while not affecting other spots significantly. This is important because the analysis
shows how during the Marcellus shale production time, gas produced went directly to Northeast
regional demand and had a significant impact. As the debate as to whether or not to drill for
shale gas in the Marcellus rages on, it is important to note that during its peak production times,
the resource had a strong impact on regional prices and demand in the Northeast.
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Chapter V. Conclusion
Horizontal drilling to extract natural gas from tight shale beds has spurred boomed
wellhead natural gas production in the past fifteen years. Meanwhile, deregulation and open
access laws of the early 1990s have paved the way for a spot market for natural gas, which is
now predicated on regional market competition. This deregulation has opened the way for
downstream pricing for natural gas from the wellhead. With a different lifespan and EUR than an
average conventional gas well, shale wells have impacted the regional market in different ways.
Using ARDL models and testing production from horizontal drilling against different
regional prices, we can assess cointegration within the market through Granger causality tests,
which depict how knowledge of past variable values can predict future values of another
variable. This technique has been noted in many different studies to test for spot market price
integration (Cuddington and Wang 2006; Doane and Spulber 1994), but has seldom been used to
test between natural gas production and price to observe integration.
Granger tests came back significant in levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% for anywhere from one
to four lag intervals (12-lag scale). There were different insights made from the analysis. First,
there was a highly significant effect of the average gas production, per lease number in a given
month from the most developed shale plays in the analysis, the Haynesville, Fayetteville,
Woodford, and Barnett, and it is known that these shale plays have had an important effect in
most regions of the natural gas market. Well count and total production from the Eagle Ford
shale in south Texas had significant feedback with the Northeast spot markets, which could
speak to a significant pipeline relationship between these two areas.
The Marcellus shale has been near the top of the agenda for most New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia politicians, and this study shows how production from
the Marcellus significantly affected the local supply and demand structure in the Northeast. With
the recent USGS survey claiming that there is over 84,000 BCF of undiscovered natural gas
within the Marcellus, this analysis shows that if drilling were to commence, the Northeast would
have a more reliable, local source of natural gas that could ease residential demand for natural
gas and spark industrial demand in certain parts. The recent New England gas crunch is
important to note, as the demand for gas in this region has increased to the point where it is
considerably above the supply that the Northeast piping infrastructure can handle. Marcellus
shale production would give the Northeast a steady supply of gas, independent of the long-
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distance piping layout from the Gulf of Mexico, Texas, or the Midwest. The environmental
concerns with regards to the water supply must be mitigated and handled appropriately, and if
this is feasible then the economic benefit of investing in Marcellus unconventional wellheads
would be beneficial for the local and national economy.
Research limitations were centered on the lack of spot prices. When asking whether or
not spot prices were affected more by shale plays closer to them, the answer was not always
clear. Regions such as southern Louisiana and west Texas, the locations of the Henry Hub and
the El Paso Permian spots respectively, have a multitude of gas sources at their disposal.
Meanwhile, California and Opal spot locations had little shale resources. These differences made
the geographic market for supply and demand difficult to quantify in certain areas. More spot
prices and areas of production would have benefited the study.
Suggestions for further research are quantifying environmental costs of hydraulic
fracturing in the Northeast, which would give tools to devise a cost-benefit analysis for hydraulic
fracturing in this area, as this study made insight into the economic effects of Northeast shale gas
drilling . Proper research must be performed to discuss all factors of hydraulic fracturing before
tapping into this vast resource. Research could also focus on how conventional gas wellheads, as
opposed to unconventional wellheads, move through the natural gas industry and affect regional
prices.
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Appendix
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Figure 1. Barnett shale total natural gas production per month.
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Figure 2. Barnett shale average gas per lease number per month and total flowing wells per
month
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Source: DI
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Figure 3. Fayetteville shale total natural gas production per month
Source: DI
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Figure 4. Fayetteville average gas per lease number and well count per month
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Source: DI
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Figure 5. Woodford total natural gas per month
Source: DI
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Figure 6. Woodford shale average gas per lease number and flowing well count per month
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Source: DI
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Figure 7. Bakken shale total natural gas production per month
Source: DI
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Figure 8. Bakken shale average natural gas per lease number and well count per month
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Source: DI
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Figure 9. Haynesville shale total natural gas production per month

Haynesville Average, Well Count

Source: DI
90000

1000

80000

900

70000

800
700

60000

600

50000

Average
Gas/Month

500
40000

400

30000

Flowing Wells

300

20000

200

10000

100
Aug-12

Mar-12

Oct-11

May-11

Dec-10

Jul-10

Feb-10

Sep-09

Apr-09

Nov-08

Jun-08

0
Jan-08

0

Figure 10. Haynesville average gas production per lease number and well count per month
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Source: DI
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Figure 11. Eagle Ford total natural gas production per month
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Figure 12. Eagle Ford average gas production per lease number and well count per month
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Figure 13. Marcellus total gas production per month
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Figure 14. Marcellus average gas production per lease number and well count per month

